Third party VPN certification

ABSTRACT

A virtual private network (VPN) over a telecommunications network is created by sending a request from a first VPN device to a second VPN device for establishing a VPN between the first and second VPN devices. The request includes a first signed certificate having a verified VPN parameter for the first VPN device. A reply is received at the first VPN device from the second VPN device that includes a second signed certificate having a verified VPN parameter for the second VPN device. The VPN is established between the first and second VPN devices based on each verified VPN parameter for each of the first and second VPN devices.

CROSS REFERENCE TO RELATED APPLICATIONS

The present application is a continuation of U.S. application Ser. No.13/110,353, filed May 18, 2011, which is a continuation of U.S.application Ser. No. 11/532,002 filed on Sep. 14, 2006, now U.S. Pat.No. 7,986,688, issued Jul. 26, 2011, which is a continuation of U.S.application Ser. No. 09/874,258, filed Jun. 6, 2001, now U.S. Pat. No.7,209,479, issued Apr. 24, 2007, which claims priority to U.S.Provisional Patent Application Ser. No. 60/262,036, filed Jan. 18, 2001,all of which are incorporated by reference in their entirety for allpurposes.

BACKGROUND OF THE APPLICATION

1. Technical Field

The present application relates to the field of telecommunications. Moreparticularly, the present application relates to a system and method forestablishing a virtual private network (VPN) over a telecommunicationsnetwork.

2. Description of the Related Art

Currently, there are two basic approaches that are used for setting up avirtual private network (VPN) between two sites. The first approach is adistributed management approach that involves each site independentlyconfiguring a local VPN device, such as a network access server (NAS).Critical network parameters are then communicated between each site forconfiguring the VPN. The second approach is a centralized managementapproach that uses software at a centralized location to enter theconfiguration parameters for each VPN device when a VPN is to beestablished. The centralized software then uploads the configurationfiles into each respective VPN device so that the VPN can beestablished.

For the distributed management approach, each site independentlyrequests a certificate from a certification authority for each VPNdevice that is controlled by the requesting site. The certificationauthority verifies the information contained in the certificate requestby verifying the identity and ownership of the public key for the VPNdevice. The certification authority then generates a certificate anddelivers the certificate to the requesting site. A system administratorat the requesting site then installs a VPN device using the newcertificate. Subsequently when a VPN is established between the twosites, detailed network parameters are communicated between systemadministrators for each site, such as a telephone, for each VPN that isestablished. The communicated network parameters are then manuallyentered into each respective VPN device by the respective systemadministrators for each VPN that is to be established.

FIG. 1 shows a system block diagram illustrating a specific example of aconventional distributed approach for establishing an Internet ProtocolSecurity (IPSEC) LAN-to-LAN VPN connection between, for example, aCompany A and a Company B. Company A and Company B each has a separaterespective local area network (LAN) LAN 101 and LAN 102. Terminaldevices, such as personal computers (PCs), are connected in a well-knownmanner to each respective LAN. While only one terminal device 103 andone terminal device 104 are shown respectively connected to LAN 101 andLAN 102 in FIG. 1, it should be understood that a plurality of terminaldevices can be connected to each LAN, but are not shown. Moreover, itshould be understood that other well-known terminal devices other thanPCs could be connected in a well-known manner to LAN 101 and LAN 102,such as printers, databases, etc.

Company A and Company B are each respectively connected to atelecommunications network 100, such as the Internet, through VPNdevices 105 and 106, such as a network access servers (NASs), a firewallor a VPN gateway. While only VPN devices 105 and 106 are shown in FIG.1, it should be understood that each of Company A and Company B can beconnected in a well-known manner to telecommunications network 100through a plurality of VPN devices. Telecommunications network 100includes routers 107-109. While only routers 107-109 are shown in FIG. 1for simplicity, it should be understood that telecommunications network100 includes a variety of well-known telecommunications devices that arenot shown.

When, for example, a user at terminal device 103 desires to establish aVPN to a user at terminal 104, each respective user contacts the localsystem administrator and requests that such a VPN be established.Detailed network parameters must be provided at both sides of the VPNtunnel for securely establishing the range of IP addresses that are tobe routed into the VPN link or accepted from the VPN link. Therespective system administrators for each site then communicate thedetailed parameters, for example, over a voice or facsimile link 110.Each system administrator manually enters the communicated networkparameters into a VPN configuration file for the desired VPN at thelocal VPN device. The configuration file is then used by conventionalLAN-to-LAN VPN software for establishing the desired VPN. Exemplaryparameter information contained in a VPN configuration file at Company Aincludes:

Left_ID=companyA.com

Left_Key=companyA.com.x509

Left_IP=10.0.0.1

LeftSubNet=192.168.0.0/255.255.255.0

LeftNextHop=10.0.0.2;

Right_ID=companyB.com

Right_Key=companyB.com.x509

RightIP=10.0.1.1

RightSubNet=192.168.1.0/255.255.255.0

RightNextHop=10.0.1.2

IPsec_Type=tunnel-esp-3des-md5-96

ReKeyRate=8 h

AuthenticationType=ike-rsasig

Exemplary parameter information contained in a VPN configuration file atCompany B includes:

Left_ID=companyB.com

Left_Key=companyB.com.x509

Left_IP=10.0.1.1

LeftSubNet=192.168.1.0/255.255.255.0

LeftNextHop=10.0.1.2

Right_ID=companyA.com

Right_Key=companyA.com.x509

RightIP=10.0.0.1

RightSubNet=192.168.0.0/255.255.255.0

RightNextHop=10.0.0.2

IPsec_Type=unnel-esp-3des-md5-96

ReKeyRate=8 h

AuthenticationType=ike-rsasig

Each new VPN defined between the LANs of Company A and Company Brequires that network parameters that are similar to those that arelisted above be entered into each respective VPN device. Becausespecific parameters about a destination LAN that will be connected tothrough the VPN are required, merely trusting the “other side” toprovide the required parameters could result in an invalid range of IPaddresses being provided to a site. Moreover, a middleman could, fromthe point of view of each end of the VPN, pretend to be the “other”system administrator and cause the VPN to be routed through a particularnode, thereby making the information being conveyed over the VPNvulnerable to a “man-in-the-middle” attack.

Another problem associated with a conventional distributed approach forestablishing a VPN is that often times there is a lengthy wait before aLAN-to-LAN VPN is established because key network administrationpersonnel at the two respective LAN sites must communicate and manuallyenter the correct network parameters into each local VPN gateway so thatthe VPN can be established. In many cases, the effort required forestablishing a LAN-to-LAN VPN is so burdensome, that a VPN is avoidedentirely, and network encryption/authentication is addressed at theapplication layer using the secure sockets layer (SSL) protocol.

The second approach for conventionally establishing a VPN is thecentralized management approach. FIG. 2 shows a system block diagramillustrating a conventional centralized management approach forestablishing a VPN. In FIG. 2, a centralized authority 201 completelycontrols and configures all VPN devices, such as VPN devices 202-204, atremote sites that are connected to a telecommunications network 205,such as the Internet. When certificates are used, centralized authority201 processes all certificate request information and acts as thecertificate authority. Alternatively, outside certificate authority canbe used for verifying the information and for generating a certificate.A system administrator from centralized authority 201 then installs thecertificate in the VPN device of an entity requesting a certificate.Additionally, an administrator at the centralized authority site alsoenters network parameters for each VPN device into a single piece ofsoftware that is stored centrally at centralized authority 201. When auser at a remote site, such as the remote site associated with VPNdevice 202, desires that a VPN be established with, for example, VPNdevice 204, the user contacts centralized authority 201 at 206 using,for example, a telephone call, e-mail or by facsimile, requesting theVPN. A system administrator at centralized authority 201 configures eachVPN device based on the respective parameters associated with each VPNdevice. The configuration is then remotely uploaded into each respectiveVPN device at 207 and 208 so that a VPN can be established between VPNdevice 202 and VPN device 204.

One problem associated with the centralized management approach is theinherent time delay that a user experiences between the time that a VPNis requested and the time that the VPN is finally established. Anotherproblem is that each remote site does not have control over the VPNdevice located at the site.

There are many currently-available VPN software solutions that simplifythe administration and connection of a large number of clients (i.e.,single IP address remote computers) for a corporate LAN, that is, whenthe IP address of the VPN tunnel device and the client address of theVPN are the same. In such situations, authentication of VPN parametersby a third party is not important.

Nevertheless, in view of the foregoing, what is needed is a way tosimplify administration for establishing a large number of LAN-to-LANVPNs. Moreover, what is needed is an approach to configuring LAN-to-LANVPNs that does not require a LAN organization to manually configureparameters for each new tunnel, or to give up control of their VPNdevice to a central authority.

SUMMARY

The present application provides a way to simplify administration forestablishing a large number of VPNs. Additionally, the presentapplication allows VPN nodes to pre-configure and pre-authenticate keyVPN parameters and easily manage VPN tunnels based on name pairs,thereby avoiding the need to enter new parameters for each new VPNtunnel.

Some advantages of the present application are provided by a method forcreating a virtual private network (VPN) over a telecommunicationsnetwork, such as the Internet, in which a request is sent from a firstVPN device to a second VPN device for establishing a VPN between thefirst and second VPN devices. The request for establishing the VPN issent in response to a request received from a client device that isassociated with the first VPN device. The request received from theclient device includes a destination designation, and preferablyincludes a source/destination designation. Alternatively, the requestreceived from the client device includes a wildcard designation for oneof the source designation and the destination designation. The requestsent to the second VPN device includes a first signed certificate havingone verified VPN parameter for the first VPN device. The second VPNdevice verifies the contents of the first signed certificate. A reply isthen received at the first VPN device from the second VPN device thatincludes a second signed certificate having one verified VPN parameterfor the second VPN device. The first VPN device verifies the contents ofthe second signed certificate. The VPN is established between the firstand second VPN devices based on each verified VPN parameter for each ofthe first and second VPN devices.

Another aspect provides a method for creating a VPN over atelecommunications network by sending a certificate request for avirtual private network device to a certification authority connected tothe telecommunications network. In one aspect, the certificate requestincludes one VPN parameter that will be used by the VPN device forestablishing a VPN over the telecommunications network. For example, thecertificate request includes one telecommunications network address thatthe VPN device will use as a client network address for a VPNestablished through the VPN device. Alternatively, the certificaterequest can include a range of telecommunications network addresses thatthe VPN device will use as client network addresses for VPNs establishedthrough the VPN device. A signed certification is then received from thecertification authority that contains the one VPN parameter contained inthe certificate request. Subsequently, the VPN device is configured tooperate in accordance with the one VPN parameter contained in the signedcertificate.

Yet another aspect provides a VPN device, such as a VPN concentrator, arouter, a firewall or a host computer, that includes a memory containinga certificate that has been signed by a certification authority. Thesigned certificate contains a VPN parameter for the VPN device that hasbeen verified by the certification authority. The VPN device alsoincludes a processor that receives a request for establishing a VPN. Theprocessor responds to the request by sending the signed certificatecontained in the memory over a telecommunications network, such as theInternet, to a second VPN device based on the received request. When therequest for establishing a VPN is received from the second VPN device,the request contains a signed certificate for the second VPN device.Accordingly, the signed certificate for the second VPN device containsat least one VPN parameter for the second VPN device that has beenverified by a certification authority. The processor verifies the signedcertificate for the second VPN device, preferably using a public keyassociated with the second VPN device, before sending the signedcertificate to the second VPN device. When the request for establishinga VPN is received from a client device associated with the VPN device,the processor sends a request to an on-line database connected to thetelecommunications network for obtaining a secure domain name addressassociated with the second VPN device. The processor then sends thesigned certificate over the telecommunications network to the securedomain name address associated with the second VPN device.

BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF THE DRAWINGS

The features herein are illustrated by way of example and not limitationin the accompanying figures in which like reference numerals indicatesimilar elements and in which:

FIG. 1 shows a system block diagram illustrating a specific example of aconventional distributed approach for establishing an IPSEC LAN-to-LANVPN connection between a company A and a company B;

FIG. 2 shows a system block diagram illustrating a conventionalcentralized management approach for establishing a VPN;

FIG. 3 shows a process flow for setting up a VPN device;

FIG. 4 is a functional block diagram of a portion of a VPN device;

FIG. 5 shows a portion of an exemplary graphical user interface foradministering VPNs; and

FIG. 6 shows a process flow for an exchange of parameters for initiatinga VPN tunnel.

DETAILED DESCRIPTION

The present application allows each site to independently control avirtual private network (VPN) device, such as a VPN concentrator, arouter, a firewall or a host computer, thereby eliminating the need forcommunicating detailed network parameters to another site each time anew VPN tunnel is established to the other site. According to oneembodiment, a certification authority verifies and signs the VPNparameters associated with each site, and which are then used forsecurely exchanging VPN parameters when a VPN tunnel is established. Forexample, one VPN parameter that the certification authority verifies andcryptographically signs is a block of Internet IP addresses that areused as client network addresses at each side of a VPN tunnel.Consequently, each side of the VPN can securely exchange all VPNparameters with the added security of having the certificate authorityverify the VPN client network address block. Moreover, new VPN tunnelsare specified by a VPN name pair instead of being manually entered withnetwork parameters each time a tunnel is established.

Thus, the features herein may eliminate the need for skilled networktechnician personnel to communicate key parameters between sites inorder to set up a VPN tunnel between two organizations. Skilled networktechnicians for each organization can therefore perform their tasksindependently, thereby removing delays caused by using the conventionalapproach of communicating network parameters between organizations.Further, the interface for setting up new VPN tunnels and monitoring thestatus of existing VPN tunnels is sufficiently simple for non-technicallabor to maintain.

When a VPN device, such as a VPN concentrator, a router, a firewall or ahost computer, is installed on a LAN and is connected to atelecommunications network, such as the Internet, the VPN device isconfigured using basic network configuration parameters that become partof a certificate request. The certificate request is sent to acertification authority, which verifies the information contained in thecertificate request, such as the identity of the VPN device, theownership of the public key for the VPN device, the range of Internet IPaddresses that will be used for the VPN device, and the networkparameters for the VPN device. The certification authority thencryptographically signs a certificate containing the network parameterscontained in the request. The installation is completed by installingthe signed certificate on the VPN device, and defining default VPNconnection policies, or rules, such as local name to remote name pairs,bandwidth limitations, and Quality of Service (QoS) parameters, so thata VPN can be established based on the connection policies. Subsequently,a user can securely set up LAN-to-LAN VPNs with another site by merelyspecifying a local name to remote name pair contained in the connectionpolicies. In the situation when the block of Internet addresses used bya particular VPN device changes, a new certificate request may berequired for the new block of Internet addresses. The certificationauthority then verifies the new information associated with the VPNdevice, cryptographically signs a new certificate, and binds theidentity with the new parameters to a secure domain name associated withthe VPN device.

FIG. 3 shows a process flow for setting up a VPN device. Prior torequesting a certificate, an entity establishes an account with aselected certification authority. The entity selects the certificationauthority based on, for example, a degree of trust that the entity hasin the particular certification authority. Such a selected certificationauthority can be linked through a “chaining link” to a top-levelcertification authority that has cryptographically signed acertification for the selected certification authority. When setting upthe account, the entity communicates information, such as user name,domain name (i.e., a secure domain name such as .scom),organization/company name, organization unit/division, and addressinformation to the selected certification authority by, for example,facsimile. Additional information that is communicated to the selectedcertification authority includes a password that will be used by theentity so that a certificate request can be submitted on-line once theaccount has been opened by the certification authority.

At block 301, the entity generates a certificate request by preferablyusing the password for accessing a web page hosted by the certificationauthority having, for example, a graphical user interface for requestinga certificate. The certificate request preferably contains fields forentering traditional VPN parameter information, such as the identity ofthe entity requesting the certificate, the hostname of the requestingentity, the public key of the requesting entity, the range of InternetIP addresses that the requesting entity would like to use as clientnetwork addresses for its VPNs, and VPN parameter information. Thecertificate request can also optionally include the specific IP addressof the VPN device. The certificate request is sent to the certificationauthority at 202 by, for example, clicking on a send certificate requestbutton displayed on the certificate request page.

At block 303, the certification authority verifies the information andparameters contained in the certificate request. The certificationauthority also manually verifies that the requested range of client IPaddresses is valid by performing reverse domain name queries on theaddress range to determine ownership of the addresses. This can be doneby contacting the Internet Service Provider (ISP) of the requestingentity for determining whether the specified addresses are allocated tothe requesting entity, and by doing “traceroute” transactions on theInternet to verify that, in fact, the addresses are being routed throughthe ISP of the requesting entity. The VPN parameters contained in thecertification request are also verified manually.

When all of the information and parameters contained in the certificaterequest has been verified to be correct, the certification authoritygenerates a cryptographically-signed certificate containing the identityof the requesting entity, the hostname of the requesting entity, thepublic key information for the requesting entity, the requested range ofInternet IP addresses and VPN parameter information. At 304, therequesting entity is notified by, for example, e-mail, that acryptographically-signed certificate has been published at 305 in anon-line central repository, or database, of certificates 306, such as aDNSSEC. That is, the cryptographically-signed certificate is stored inan on-line central repository 306, such as a password-protected website, so that the requesting entity can access the signed certificate bysubmitting a password. The requesting entity then accesses thecryptographically-signed certificate using the password at 307,downloads and installs the certificate on the VPN device and configuressecurity policies at 308. When the entity receives the certificate, theVPN device IP address is published to a central DNS server. Preferably,the only information that is retained in the central repository relatingto the signed certification and which is publicly available is the VPNdevice address associated with a name (i.e., the same name as the nameassociated with the certificate), the client host address associatedwith a name, and a valid certificate ID associated with a name (so thatthe certificate can be revoked). Preferably, the certificate and thepublic key associated with the certificate are not publicly accessible.

Subsequently when a VPN is initiated, the entity sends thecryptographically-signed certificate to another party contained in atunnel proposal message. The other party independently verifies thecertification authority signature on the certificate and responds bysending to the entity a certificate and VPN parameters for the VPNdevice controlled by the party. The entity, in turn, independentlyverifies the certification authority signature on the certificate of theother party. When the certificates of each respective party have beenverified, the VPN is then established between the entity and the otherparty based on the exchanged VPN parameters.

Similarly, when another party wants to establish a tunnel to the VPNdevice of the entity, the other party obtains the IP address for thesecure domain name of the entity from the central DNS server, and sendsa tunnel proposal message containing the signed certificate associatedwith the party to the entity. The entity independently verifies thesignature of the certification authority contained in the certificationof the party, and responds by sending the certification of the entity tothe other party. The other party independently verifies the signature ofthe certification authority contained in the certification of theentity. Subsequently, a VPN is established between the entity and theother party. Thus, each party retains complete control of access to acertificate.

While only a single on-line repository is implied in FIG. 3, it shouldbe understood that a cryptographically-signed certificate can bepublished in a plurality of distributed on-line repositories that arecontrolled by a single certification authority. It should also beunderstood that the cryptographically-signed certificate canalternatively be published in a plurality of on-line repositories thatare each controlled by a different certification authority. Furtherstill, it should be understood that the VPN device IP address can bepublished to a distributed DNS server system once the information andparameters contained in a certificate request have been verified by acertification authority.

In the event that the certificate request did not include a specific IPaddress of the VPN device because the request contained a range of IPaddresses, the requesting entity can update the IP address of its VPNdevice within the on-line certificate repository by sending a signedmessage to the certificate repository having the IP address of the VPNdevice. According to one embodiment, each certificate request is keyedby a unique scom domain name. Thus, the features herein may providestrong security, but avoids the situation in which an entity must obtaina new certificate each time a small change in VPN parameters occurs. Tothis end, the certificate authority can sign the entire address block,or space, owned by the VPN device entity, and that entity can establisha security policy in which only a portion of the address space is usedfor client addresses when a VPN tunnel is established to the .scomdomain name of the entity. The actual address of the VPN device does notneed to be part of the certificate because when a VPN tunnel isestablished to the device, the device uniquely identifies itself usingmessages signed by the private key associated with the VPN device. So,each VPN device can later securely publish its address to a DNS serverso other parties can find the VPN device by name on that particular IPaddress. When the actual address of the VPN device is verified, the newIP address of the VPN device is published to the central repositoryand/or DNS.

The VPN device can also optionally publish to the repository a list ofentity names to which the central repository should respond, therebylimiting the number of entities that have access to the IP address andcertificate of the entity controlling the VPN device. Accordingly, themessage from the requesting entity publishing the list of allowedcontact names is also signed by the requesting entity, and verified bythe on-line repository. The on-line repository verifies informationpublished to it by a party by checking the signature on the publishingmessage using the certificate of the publisher, and also by checking thecertification authority signature on the certificate of the publisher.

FIG. 4 shows a functional block diagram of a VPN device 400. VPN device400 includes a processor 401 and a memory 402. Memory 402 storesinformation that is used for establishing a VPN in the form of aVPNbyName table 403 and a SecurityPolicy table 404. Memory 402 alsostores other commands and data that are used in a well-known manner byprocessor 401 for providing various well-known system operating andoverhead function capabilities. VPN device 400 is interposed, forexample, between a LAN 405 and a telecommunications network 100.Terminal devices (not shown) that are connected to LAN 405 send requeststo VPN device 400 over LAN 405 using well-known communication protocolsfor establishing a VPN link over telecommunications network 100. VPNdevice 400 can alternatively be interposed between a server (not shown)and a network 100. VPN device 400 also receives requests from other VPNdevices (not shown) over telecommunications network 100 for establishinga VPN link to the requesting VPN device.

Information contained in VPNbyName table 403 and SecurityPolicy table404 is used by VPN device 400 for instantiating a VPN link. Preferably,VPNbyName table 403 contains a list of VPN connection rules by name. Therules are preferably specified by a source/destination designation,referred to herein as a VPN name pair. A VPN name pair sets forth alocal name (i.e., a local name corresponding a certificate held by thelocal VPN device), and a remote name for a VPN. The type of VPNconnection is also specified for each name rule, such as whether astanding VPN link should be maintained or whether an on-demand VPN linkshould be established in response to a connection request. A bandwidthand/or quality of service (QoS) rule can optionally be specified for alink.

An exemplary policy can be defined so that a VPN device will accept aninput from a DNS proxy or a modified DNS server and/or willautomatically attempt to instantiate a VPN link based on a destinationname. Moreover, the VPN name pair rules in VPNbyName table 403 can bespecified using wildcard flags. For example, a VPN device having a localname of locality.company.com can have a remote name entry of*.company.com for either maintaining a standing VPN with every*.company.com VPN device or for allowing a VPN of opportunity connectionwith from any *.company.com VPN device. As used herein, the phrase“standing VPN” means a VPN connection that is maintained on a more orless constant basis. A rule associated with a standing VPN can bedefined so that VPN device 400 determines on a user-defined periodicbasis whether a standing VPN connection is in place, and if not,attempts to reestablish the VPN connection. Also as used herein, thephrase “VPN of opportunity” means a VPN connection that is created ondemand or in response to a request to a VPN device that is registeredwith a central certificate server (repository).

The wildcard flag for specifying a VPN name pair can be extended to awildcard that includes all names in which VPN's of opportunity areautomatically established with all VPN devices that are registered withthe central certificate server. For example, when the VPN device 400receives an .scom request for establishing a VPN to another site, VPNdevice 400 looks in VPNbyName table 403 for the local name that is to beused by VPN device 400 for representing VPN device 400 to the othersite. For instance, when a user on the nodel.acme.scom LAN wants to lookup the host www.node2.acme.scom and VPNbyName table 403 contains rulelocal_name nodel.acme.scom, remote_name=*.acme.scom, then the connectionrule would automatically allow an outbond VPN request towww.node2.acme.scom. Accordingly, the VPN device at www.node2.acme.scom,would also need a matching connection rulelocal_name=www.node2.acme.scom, remote_name=*.acme.scom contained withinthe VPNbyName table so that the VPN request would be accepted. The VPNdevice at www.node2.acme.scom would authenticate the inbound VPN requestand respond accordingly so that the VPN will be set up.

SecurityPolicy table 404 associates a local name (i.e., the scom namethat is being used for representing the VPN device on the network) witha particular signed certificate. A host computer can have several localnames that are each tied to a respectively different security policy,signed certificate and the VPN network parameters for one side of a VPN.Specifically, for each local name in SecurityPolicy table 404,SecurityPolicy table 404 contains information relating to the clientnetwork address block, the IP address of the VPN device, the gateway IPaddress, and the allowable range of VPN security parameters (includingminimum and maximum acceptable encryption algorithms, key lengths, andrekey rates). Accordingly, the client network address block for thelocal name must be within the client network address block that has beenverified and signed by the certification authority (i.e., included inthe signed certificate). The IP address for the local name must bewithin the client network address block that has been signed by thecertification authority.

When VPN device 400 receives a request for establishing a VPN from aterminal device (not shown) connected to LAN 405 that specifies a VPNname pair, i.e., a particular local name and a particular remote name,processor 401 queries VPNbyName table 403 for constraints that are to beadhered to when establishing the requested VPN, and queries SecurityPolicy table 404 for network parameters that are to be used by VPNdevice 400 when establishing the requested VPN. The features hereinallow LAN-to-LAN VPNs to be established by, for example, adding namepair rules to VPNbyName table 403, without requiring that completeentries be entered into a VPN device, such as all of the parametersdescribed in connection with FIG. 1, for each separate VPN tunnel.

FIG. 5 shows a portion of an exemplary graphical user interface 500 foradministering VPNs. A portion 501 of interface 500 allows a local systemadministrator to add a VPN name pair to VPNbyName table 403. A portion502 of interface 500 allows a local system administrator to select andedit VPNbyName parameters and security policy rules for an existing VPNname pair. When a new VPN name pair is added, the local name is enteredand/or selected from a list of available local names at field 503. Theremote name of the VPN name pair is entered into field 504. A policyname that is to be associated with the VPN name pair is selected atfield 505, and whether a VPN established for the VPN name pair is astanding link or a link of opportunity is selected at field 506. A newVPN name pair is added to VPNbyName table 403 by, for example, clickingon Add Network field 507. An existing VPN name pair can be edited ordeleted by selecting the VPN name pair in portion 502, and then clickingon the appropriate function link (i.e., edit or delete) indicated at508.

Another aspect provides a secure exchange of VPN parameters betweensites when each VPN is established. The conventional ISAKMP/IKE IPSECsession initiation approach can be used as a framework for exchangingall of the data needed for setting up a VPN. This differs from aconventional ISKAMP/IKE IPSEC session initiation approach by verifyingthe VPN parameters that are exchanged using the ISAKMP/IKE approach.Notably, the current IPSEC VPN approach requires that a centraladministrator independently verify the client network blocks for eachparty by manually providing the VPN parameters to the VPN software wheneach new tunnel is created. In contrast, the features herein providethat the client network blocks are exchanged via ISAKMP/IKE and then areverified to be within the range of the client network block on thecertificate for a VPN device. Additional VPN parameters that areexchanged and verified can include the client network block, the IPaddress of the VPN devices, and the gateway IP address. Thus, using anoutside trusted third-party certification authority for verifying clientnetwork block parameters allows all of the VPN parameters to be securelyexchanged when a VPN is established, and thereby allowing a VPN to bespecified by a only a name pair.

FIG. 6 shows a process flow of an exchange of parameters for initiatinga VPN. In FIG. 6, a companyA.com VPN device intends to initiate a VPNconnection with a VPN device at companyB.com. First, the companyA.comVPN device sends a request at 601 to a central certificate repository at602 (or a central DNS) requesting the IP address (i.e., the .scom IPaddress) for the remote name of a VPN name pair. The central certificaterepository can optionally verify the identity of companyA.com based onthe public key contained in the request, and optionally determinewhether there exists a policy rule (specified by companyB.com) thatprevents the repository from responding to the request from companyA.comwith the information about companyB.com. In the event that there is nopolicy rule blocking a reply to companyA.com, the central certificaterepository then sends a message to companyA.com at 603 containing the IPaddress for companyB.com.

The VPN device at companyA.com uses the .scom address information forcontacting companyB.com by generating a VPN tunnel proposal message thatcontains the certificate and security policy data of CompanyA.com.CompanyA.com also signs the VPN tunnel proposal message. The signed VPNtunnel proposal message is then sent to CompanyB.com at 604 via, forexample, the Internet.

When the VPN device of companyB.com receives the VPN tunnel proposalmessage from the companyA.com, the VPN device of companyB.com initiallydetermines whether it should respond to the tunnel proposal messagebased on a policy rule that prohibits a reply to companyA.com. When nopolicy rule exists preventing the VPN device of companyB.com fromresponding to the VPN of companyA.com, the VPN device of companyB.comdetermines whether a valid entry in a locally-stored VPNbyName tablematches the name of the VPN device for companyA.com (i.e., remote namefrom the point of view of companyB.com) to the name of the VPN device ofcompanyB.com (i.e., the local name from the point of view ofcompanyB.com). The VPN device of companyB.com verifies that thesignature on the message sent by companyA.com is valid by contacting thecentral repository for the public key for companyA.com. The VPN deviceof companyB.com also verifies that the client network address blockproposed by companyA.com is within the network address block that wasverified and signed by the certification authority. The certificate forcompanyA.com is verified (i.e., the certification authority signature iscorrect and a validity period set by the certification authority for thecertificate covers the current date/time). Finally, the VPN device ofcompanyB.com verifies that it can negotiate a security policy withcompanyA.com by examining any proposed algorithms contained in thetunnel proposal message, such as an encryption algorithm, an integritycheck algorithm, a rekey rate, client network blocks, a tunnel mode, keylengths, and rekey rates. CompanyB.com must be able to find anintersection with the allowable range of these values in its securitypolicy so that a VPN can be established.

When all of these steps are completed, the VPN device of companyB.comsends a signed VPN tunnel proposal response to companyA.com at 605containing the signed certificate, security policy, and IP gatewayaddress for companyB.com. The VPN device of companyA.com receives thereply message and performs a similar process of verification of theinformation provided by companyB.com.

Once both companyA.com and companyB.com are satisfied with theirrespective verifications of the VPN parameters contained in the tunnelproposal messages, both companyA.com and companyB.com then have all theinformation necessary for establishing a VPN tunnel. Initiation of theVPN can be performed based on an IPSEC VPN, such as by performing anISAKMP/IKE key exchange process at 606.

It should be understood that any and all of the processes describedabove could be performed by a computer-based device. It should also beunderstood that any and all of the processes described herein could bestored on a computer-readable medium in the form of computer-executableinstructions.

While the features herein have been described in connection with theillustrated embodiments, it will be appreciated and understood thatmodifications maybe made without departing from the true spirit andscope of the invention.

The invention claimed is:
 1. A method for creating a securecommunication link, comprising: querying an online database to request asecure domain name address of a device; receiving the secure domain nameaddress in response to the querying; facilitating an exchange of one ormore verified certificates with the device in order to establish thesecure communication link using the verified certificates; andcommunicating with the device using the established secure communicationlink.
 2. The method of claim 1, wherein the querying includes providinga remote name of a pre-authorized secure name pair to the onlinedatabase, the method further comprising: storing information identifyinga plurality of pre-authorized secure name pairs, the name pairs eachincluding a local device name and a remote device name for a securecommunication link.
 3. The method of claim 2, wherein the informationidentifying the plurality of pre-authorized secure name pairs furtherincludes information identifying a secure connection type for the pair.4. The method of claim 2, wherein the information identifying theplurality of pre-authorized secure name pairs further includes wildcardinformation in at least one of the local or remote device names.
 5. Themethod of claim 1, further comprising: storing a plurality of verifiedcertificates, the plurality of verified certificates containingdifferent secure communication link parameters.
 6. The method of claim5, further comprising: associating the stored plurality of verifiedcertificates with a plurality of different local names.
 7. The method ofclaim 1, wherein the querying includes providing a public key to theonline database.
 8. The method of claim 1, wherein the received securedomain name address is used in the exchange of the one or more verifiedcertificates.
 9. The method of claim 1, wherein: the one or moreverified certificates each contains at least one verified securecommunication parameter for a respective device, and the communicatingusing the secure communication link includes using the at least onesecure communication parameter from the one or more verifiedcertificates.
 10. A non-transitory computer-readable medium storingcomputer-executable instructions for performing the following: providinga remote name of a pre-authorized secure name pair to an onlinedatabase; receiving a secure domain name address for a device inresponse to the providing; facilitating an exchange of one or moreverified certificates for the secure communication link with the deviceusing the secure domain name address; and facilitating the establishmentof a secure communication link using the one or more verifiedcertificates.
 11. The non-transitory medium of claim 10, furthercomprising computer-executable instructions for: facilitating storage ofinformation identifying a plurality of pre-authorized secure name pairs,the name pairs each including a local device name and a remote devicename for a secure communication link.
 12. The non-transitory medium ofclaim 11, wherein the information identifying the plurality ofpre-authorized secure name pairs further includes informationidentifying a secure communication link type for the pair.
 13. Thenon-transitory medium of claim 11, wherein the information identifyingthe plurality of pre-authorized secure name pairs further includeswildcard information in at least one of the local or remote devicenames.
 14. The non-transitory medium of claim 10, further comprisingcomputer-executable instructions for: facilitating storage of aplurality of verified certificates for the first device, the pluralityof verified certificates containing different secure communication linkparameters.
 15. The non-transitory medium of claim 14, furthercomprising computer-executable instructions for: associating the storedplurality of verified certificates with a plurality of different localnames.
 16. The non-transitory medium of claim 10, wherein providing aremote name includes providing a public key to the online database. 17.The non-transitory medium of claim 10, wherein: the one or more verifiedcertificates each contain at least one verified secure communicationparameter, and the establishing uses the at least one verified securecommunication parameter from the one or more verified certificates. 18.A device, comprising: a memory storing a plurality of verifiedcertificates for facilitating the establishment of a securecommunication link with the device, the verified certificates each beingassociated with a different local name associated with the device; and aprocessor configured to: receive a request to initiate a securecommunication link from a second device, and locate a name in therequest and compare the name with the plurality of different local namesto identify at least one stored verified certificate for use inestablishing a secure communication link with the the second device. 19.The device of claim 18, wherein the memory further stores informationidentifying policy restrictions associated with one or more of the localnames.
 20. The device of claim 18, wherein the device is configured toprovide secure communication links for a plurality of client devices.